

# Data-Driven Auction Design I

## Model and Basic Techniques

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Model

Basic Techniques

Upper Bound Techniques

Lower Bound Techniques

Settling the Single-Item Single-Bidder Case

## Single-Item Auction

- Sell 1 item to  $n$  bidders, to maximize revenue
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  2. Seller picks allocations  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$  and payments  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$
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- Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC)

$$\forall i, v_i, b_i, b_{-i}: \quad v_i x_i(v_i, b_{-i}) - p_i(v_i, b_{-i}) \geq v_i x_i(b_i, b_{-i}) - p_i(b_i, b_{-i})$$

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- Individually Rational (IR)

$$\forall i, v_i, b_{-i}: \quad v_i x_i(v_i, b_{-i}) - p_i(v_i, b_{-i}) \geq 0$$

## Myerson's Theory

- DSIC and IR are equivalent to
  1.  $x_i(v_i, b_{-i})$  is monotone (e.g., step function)
  2.  $p_i(v_i, b_{-i})$  is the area on the left of  $x_i(v_i, b_{-i})$  as a function of  $v_i$  (e.g., threshold price above which  $x_i = 1$ , if  $x_i$  is a step function)

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- Expected revenue is equivalent to expected virtual welfare

$$\mathbf{E} \sum_{i=1}^n \varphi_i(v_i) x_i(v)$$

where the virtual value  $\varphi_i$  is

$$\varphi_i(v_i) = v_i - \frac{1 - F_i(v_i)}{f_i(v_i)}$$



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
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- Myerson's optimal auction deferred to next lecture

## Optimal Pricing in the Single-Bidder Case

- Sell 1 item to 1 bidder, whose value  $v$  is drawn from  $D$
- Every DSIC and IR auction is equivalent to posting a price  $p$
- Revenue of price  $p$  is  $p \cdot q(p)$ , where  $q(p) = 1 - F(p)$  is  $p$ 's **quantile**
- Revenue curve in quantile space  $R(q) = v(q) \cdot q$



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  - $1 - \varepsilon$  (multiplicative) approximation
    - Regular distributions (i.e., concave revenue curve)
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    - [1,  $H$ ]-bounded distributions



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- The sample complexity is smallest number of samples needed

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
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
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
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
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  1. Estimate the revenue of one price  $p$  up to  $\varepsilon$
  2. Prices “close to”  $p$  cannot yield much higher revenue (up to  $\varepsilon$ )  
 $\Rightarrow$  Consider finitely many prices whose “neighborhoods” cover  $[0, 1]$
  3. Estimate the revenue of all these representative prices up to  $\varepsilon$





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**Theorem (Chernoff-Hoeffding, User-Friendly Version)**

$X_1, X_2, \dots, X_m$  are *i.i.d.* RV over  $[0, 1]$ . Let  $\mu = \mathbf{E} X_i$ . With probability  $1 - \delta$  we have

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**Conclusion:** Using  $m \gtrsim \frac{\log \frac{1}{\delta}}{\varepsilon^2}$  samples  $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_m \stackrel{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} D$  and letting  $X_i = \mathbf{1}_{v_i \geq p}$ , we can estimate  $q(p)$  (and thus  $p$ 's revenue) up to  $\varepsilon$  additive error w.p.  $1 - \delta$

## Step 2: Covering the Price Space

Consider  $\tilde{p}$  that is “close to”  $p$ . Can  $\tilde{p}$ 's revenue be much larger than  $p$ 's?

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1. If  $p + \varepsilon \geq \tilde{p} > p$ , then:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{p} \cdot q(\tilde{p}) &\leq \tilde{p} \cdot q(p) \\ &\leq (p + \varepsilon) \cdot q(p) \\ &\leq p \cdot q(p) + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

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2. If  $p > \tilde{p} \geq p - \varepsilon$ , then  $\tilde{p} \cdot q(\tilde{p})$  could be almost  $p \cdot q(p)$   
e.g.,  $p = 1$ ,  $\tilde{p} = 0.98$ , and  $D$  is point mass at 0.99

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**Conclusion:**  $p$  covers  $[p, p + \varepsilon]$ ; prices  $0, \varepsilon, 2\varepsilon, \dots, 1 - \varepsilon$  cover the price space  $[0, 1]$

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For any (bad) events  $E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n$ , we have  $\Pr[E_1 \cup E_2 \cup \dots \cup E_n] \leq \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[E_i]$

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**Conclusion:** Using  $m \gtrsim \frac{\log \frac{1}{\varepsilon\delta}}{\varepsilon^2}$  i.i.d. samples, we can estimate the revenue of all prices up to  $\varepsilon$  additive error w.p.  $1 - \delta$

## Upper Bound for $[0, 1]$ -Bounded Distribution

**Empirical Revenue Maximizer (ERM).** Return price  $p$  that maximizes revenue w.r.t. uniform distribution over the samples (empirical distribution).

### Theorem

ERM using  $m \gtrsim \frac{\log \frac{1}{\epsilon \delta}}{\epsilon^2}$  samples is an  $\epsilon$  additive approximation w.p.  $1 - \delta$ .

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□ Consider two value distributions  $P$  and  $Q$  that are

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No price  $p$  is an  $\varepsilon$  additive approximation for both  $P$  and  $Q$
  
- We next present
  1. Statistical distances that characterize the number of samples needed to distinguish two distributions
  2. Sufficient condition under which two distributions are “similar” enough
  3. Construction of  $P$  and  $Q$



## Distinguish $P$ and $Q$ with One Sample

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- Following this strategy, what is the total error?

$$\Pr[\text{predict } P \mid D = Q] + \Pr[\text{predict } Q \mid D = P]$$

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- Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence

$$\text{KL}(P\|Q) = \sum_v P(v) \log \frac{P(v)}{Q(v)}$$

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## Distinguish $P$ and $Q$ with Multiple Samples

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- Relation to TV (Pinsker's inequality)
- Direct sum

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TV}(P, Q) &\leq \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \text{KL}(P\|Q)} \\ \text{KL}(P^m\|Q^m) &= m \cdot \text{KL}(P\|Q) \end{aligned}$$

## Distinguish $P$ and $Q$ with Samples: a Summary

- **What we want:** One needs  $m \gtrsim \frac{1}{\epsilon^2}$  samples to distinguish  $P$  and  $Q$  w.p.  $\frac{2}{3}$

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Reminder

$$\text{KL}(P\|Q) = \sum_v P(v) \log \frac{P(v)}{Q(v)}$$

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## Lower Bound for $[0, 1]$ -Bounded Distributions

### Theorem

Any  $\varepsilon$  additive approximation algorithm uses at least  $m \gtrsim \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}$  samples.

- Construct two  $[0, 1]$ -bounded value distributions  $P$  and  $Q$  that are
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# Lower Bound for $[0, 1]$ -Bounded Distributions


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$v$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
$P(v)$	$\frac{1}{2} + 2\varepsilon$	$\frac{1}{2} - 2\varepsilon$
$Q(v)$	$\frac{1}{2} - 2\varepsilon$	$\frac{1}{2} + 2\varepsilon$





Model

Basic Techniques

Upper Bound Techniques

Lower Bound Techniques

Settling the Single-Item Single-Bidder Case


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Distributions	Sample Complexity
[0, 1]-Bounded	$\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}$
Regular distributions	
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

## Regular Distributions

- Value distribution  $D$  is **regular** if  $\varphi_D(v)$  is nondecreasing  
⇔ The revenue curve  $R(q)$  is concave



# Regular Distributions

- Value distribution  $D$  is **regular** if  $\varphi_D(v)$  is nondecreasing
  - $\Leftrightarrow$  The revenue curve  $R(q)$  is concave



- ERM does not converge** for some regular distribution
  - With constant probability we get two samples with quantiles less than  $\frac{1}{m}$

## What goes wrong?

1. Estimate the revenue of **one price**  $p$  up to  $1 - \varepsilon \approx e^{-\varepsilon}$  **approximation**
2. Prices between  $p$  and  $e^\varepsilon p$  cannot yield much higher revenue  
 $\Rightarrow$  Consider **finitely(?)** many prices whose “**neighborhoods**” cover  $[0, \infty)$
3. Estimate the revenue of **all these representative prices**

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### Theorem (Bernstein Inequality, User-Friendly Version)

$X_1, X_2, \dots, X_m$  are i.i.d. RV over  $[0, 1]$ . Let  $\mu = \mathbf{E} X_i$ . With probability  $1 - \delta$  we have

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- **Unbounded** when for small quantile  $\mu$  (i.e., high prices)


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
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
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
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


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


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
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




## Existence of a “Good Enough” Price with “Large” Quantile

**Observation:** By concavity of revenue curve, there exists a price  $p$  such that

1. It is an  $1 - \varepsilon$  approximation
2. Its quantile is at least  $\varepsilon$



## Upper Bound for Regular Distributions

$q$ -**Guarded ERM**. Return price  $p$  that maximizes the empirical revenue, among prices whose empirical quantiles are at least  $q$ .

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## Lower Bound for Regular Distributions

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Any  $1 - \varepsilon$  approximation algorithm uses at least  $m \gtrsim \frac{1}{\varepsilon^3}$  samples.


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## [1, H]-Bounded Distributions

### Theorem

$\frac{1}{H}$ -Guarded ERM using  $m \gtrsim \frac{H \log \frac{1}{\varepsilon \delta}}{\varepsilon^2}$  samples is a  $1 - \varepsilon$  approximation w.p.  $1 - \delta$ .

### Theorem

Any  $1 - \varepsilon$  approximation algorithm uses at least  $m \gtrsim \frac{H}{\varepsilon^2}$  samples.

# MHR Distributions

## Theorem

ERM using  $m \gtrsim \frac{\log \frac{1}{\varepsilon\delta}}{\varepsilon^{1.5}}$  samples is an  $1 - \varepsilon$  approximation w.p.  $1 - \delta$ .

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Regular distributions	$\frac{1}{\epsilon^3}$
MHR distributions	$\frac{1}{\epsilon^{1.5}}$
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□ **Upper Bound:**

Concentration inequality + covering of price space + union bound

□ **Lower Bound:**

Reduction to sample complexity of distinguishing two distributions

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□ **Lower Bound:**

Reduction to sample complexity of distinguishing two distributions

**Take-Home Question:** Can we get all upper bounds using the same algorithm?

## References

1. Richard Cole and Tim Roughgarden. “*The sample complexity of revenue maximization.*” In Proceedings of the 46th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ACM, pp. 243–252, 2014.
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